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Abstract This paper gives a denition of self-reference on the basis of the depen-
dence relation given by Leitgeb (2005), and the dependence digraph by Beringer
& Schindler (2015). Unlike the usual discussion about self-reference of paradoxes
centering around Yablo's paradox and its variants, I focus on the paradoxes of
nitary characteristic, which are given again by use of Leitgeb's dependence re-
lation. They are called `locally nite paradoxes', satisfying that any sentence in
these paradoxes can depend on nitely many sentences. I prove that all locally
nite paradoxes are self-referential in the sense that there is a directed cycle in
their dependence digraphs. This paper also studies the `circularity dependence' of
paradoxes, which was introduced by Hsiung (2014). I prove that the locally nite
paradoxes have circularity dependence in the sense that they are paradoxical only
in the digraph containing a proper cycle. The proofs of the two results are based
directly on Konig's innity lemma. In contrast, this paper also shows that Yablo's
paradox and its 89-unwinding variant are non-self-referential, and neither McGee's
paradox nor the !-cycle liar has circularity dependence.
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1 Introduction
Provided a set of sentences represents a truth-theoretical paradox, is it self-
referential or not? For those paradoxes involving in nite sentences, such as the
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Liar paradox, this can be easily answered. But there are also paradoxical sentences
whose self-reference is still a controversial issue among contemporary truth the-
orists. One of such examples is the sentences in Yablo's paradox (Yablo (1993)).
There had been lots of discussions around the problem whether the set of Yablo's
sentences is self-referential: some people think that it is free of self-reference (see
Sorensen (1998), Tennant (1995) and Bringsjord & Heuveln (2003)), while others
insist that it is self-referential (see Priest (1997) and Beall (2001)). To a great
extent, the point at issue is in what sense we use the word 'self-reference' when we
talk about the paradoxical sentences and other pathological ones. As is suggested
by Leitgeb (2002, p. 3), we has to put forward a `clear-cut denition' for the self-
reference before asserting some paradox is `self-referential' or not, otherwise the
relevant debates may be `substantially awed' because what we use might be an
`unclear and inadequate' notion of self-reference.
Literally, to say a sentence is self-referential is to say this sentence refers to or
depends on itself. And so, in order to give the notion of self-reference, we must rst
dene how a sentence depends on or refers to other ones. This is where we need
a notion of the `dependence (or reference) relation' over sentences. Furthermore,
to incorporate the indirectly self-referential sentences into the extension of self-
reference, we have to consider not only what a sentence depends on, but also what
those sentences that the original sentence depends on depend on, and so on. Thus,
for any arbitrary set of sentences, we need to provide a device to show how these
sentences are related to each other according to the dependence relation. This
device is the concept of so-called 'dependence digraph' or `reference digraph'.
Provided that we work in a sentential language, it is possible to set up the
dependence relation and the corresponding dependence digraph by an immediate
way. Actually, the dependence relation of sentences is represented as `sentence nets'
and the dependence digraph is dened in terms of the syntactic constituents of sen-
tences. To avoid digressing, I postpone the relevant discussions to the last section.
For now, our working language is the standard language for truth and paradoxes,
that is, the rst-order language for arithmetic with a distinguished predicate T .
The situation is dierent and more complex. Fortunately, we already have had the
two necessary concepts for the rst-order language. First, the dependence relation
was advanced by Leitgeb in his paper `What truth depends on' (Leitgeb (2005), p.
161). This concept is fundamental for studying the self-reference of paradoxes. I
pay attribute to Leitgeb's ingenious idea about the dependence relation by the use
of the title of the paper. Second, the dependence digraph was given by Beringer
& Schindler (2015). This is a derived concept from Leitgeb's notion of dependence
relation.
It is an easy task to give the denition of self-reference once we make clear the
dependence relation and dependence digraph of sentences. Actually, Leitgeb (2005,
p. 168) gave a formal denition of self-reference by use of his dependence relation.
As we will see, Leitgeb's notion of self-reference is something like the notion of
direct self-reference. This is too restricted because it throws these indirectly self-
referential sentences out of the extension of self-reference. What Leitgeb missed is
the concept of dependence digraph. 1 On the other hand, Beringer and Schindler
1 This is not to reproach Leitgeb but to show a key concept in search of a more general
notion of self-reference. After all, Leitgeb's main purpose of using the dependence relation,
is not to study self-reference of paradoxes but to give an adequate denition of truth in the
rst-order language of arithmetic with the unitary predicate T . See Leitgeb (2005), pp. 171.
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did not give a denition of self-reference yet, because their use of dependence
digraph has a dierent goal.
In this paper, I will give a denition of self-reference on the basis of Leitgeb's de-
pendence relation, and Beringer and Schindler's dependence digraph. After doing
that, I will focus on a class of paradoxes of certain nite characteristics, namely the
locally nite paradoxes.2 Again, this is dened in terms of Leitgeb's dependence
relation. Roughly speaking, locally nite paradoxes are those paradoxes consisting
of only sentences which can depend on a nite set of sentences. The main target
of this paper is to investigate the self-reference and related issues of locally nite
paradoxes (together with some typical non-locally-nite paradoxes as a contrast).
The main results I will establish are summarized in Table 1.
Features
Paradoxes Test Group Control Group
Locally nite paradoxes
Yablo's paradox !-cycle liar and
and its variants McGee's paradox
Self-reference X  X
Circularity-dependence X X 
Table 1
The third row in Table 1 stands for the results about the self-reference of para-
doxes. On one hand, all locally nite paradoxes are self-referential. More precisely,
if a locally nite set of sentences is paradoxical, it is self-referential (Theorem 2).
On the other hand, there are some non-locally-nite paradoxes that are not self-
referential: Yablo's paradox and its variants are such examples, and at the same
time, there are also some non-locally-nite but self-referential paradoxes such as
the !-cycle liar and McGee's paradox.
A point worth emphasizing is that the main object of our study is the locally
nite paradoxes rather than Yablo's paradox or any variant of it. To give a for-
mal denition of self-reference, we should rst capture our intuition about those
paradoxes whose self-reference is undisputed. As we will see, it is these locally
nite paradoxes that include all the known paradoxes of nitary characteristics,
whose self-reference is generally accepted by philosophers | no matter how they
consider the self-reference of Yablo's paradox. In this sense, a reasonable denition
of self-reference must, above all, pass the test of these paradoxes of nitary char-
acteristics. That is why we take these paradoxes into the `test group'. Of course,
for an adequate denition of self-reference, this is only a necessary condition and
other aspects must be considered. For instance, one may wonder whether there
exist some examples of non-self-referential paradoxes according to the denition.
The existence of such examples will make the notion of self-reference more inter-
esting. At this point, the paradoxes in the control group play their role, and they
are the candidates free of self-reference.
As far as I know, most current controversies about self-reference of paradoxes
center around Yablo's paradox or its variants. However, Yablo's paradox is not so
important as the locally nite paradoxes in the present work. When I prove that it
2 The notion of local niteness, in the form of digraph, was oered by Rabern et al. (2013,
p. 754) in the context of sentential language. See the discussion of the last section. By the way,
by a paradox I always mean a paradoxical set of sentences.
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is not self-referential (Example 1), my main purpose is not to settle disputes about
the self-reference of Yablo's paradox. Rather, Yablo's paradox is merely something
like an element in the control group: it is a typical non-locally-nite paradox. My
focus is still on the class of locally nite paradoxes. Let me stress again: if out
target is to dene a reasonable notion of self-reference, the test group, that is, the
main object that we should study, is those undisputedly self-referential paradoxes.
In this respect, Yablo's paradox and its variants are no more than members in the
control group.
The fourth row of Table 1 is about the circularity dependence of paradoxes,
which is a notion similar to the notion of self-reference but dierent from the
latter. The notion of circularity dependence is introduced by Hsiung (2014, p. 35).
And this notion is founded on the notion of paradoxicality in a digraph (Hsiung
(2009a), p. 248). Roughly, when we say a paradox have circularity dependence,
we mean it is paradoxical only in a digraph containing a proper cycle. The idea
behind the notion of paradoxicality in a digraph is that paradoxes are conditionally
contradictory. As we all know, paradoxical sentences lead to a contradiction, but
unlike those contradictory sentences such as `the snow is white and it is not white',
they are not absolutely contradictory so that we could nd some way to make
them consistent with our cherished theories. Remember that in classical logic, a
contradiction follows from applying Tarski's famous T-scheme (that is, T pAq, i
A) to any paradoxical sentence. Now if we replace Tarski's T-scheme by Scheme
(1), then whether a contradiction follows depends on what paradox is applied to
Scheme (1) and what digraph is involved in this scheme.
T pAq (holds) at v, i A (holds) at u, (1)
where u and v are any points in the domain of a digraph such that u bears the
binary relation of the digraph to v. It is at this point that we can use digraphs
to show under what conditions a paradox actually generates a contradiction.3 For
instance, it can be proved that the Liar (sentence) is paradoxical in and only in
the digraphs containing an odd cycle (Hsiung (2009a), p. 253).
Return to Table 1. The second main result I will prove about the locally nite
paradoxes is that if a locally nite set of sentences is paradoxical in a digraph,
then there is some proper cycle in this digraph (Theorem 5). Or briey, all locally
nite paradoxes have circularity dependence. We provide specic examples to il-
lustrate this general result. Among the locally nite paradoxes, the simplest one
is the Liar paradox. It has circularity dependence: as is just mentioned, the Liar
is paradoxical only in those digraphs containing an odd cycle. More generally, for
any positive number n = 2i(2j + 1), the n-cycle liar (sometimes also called the
n-liar) is paradoxical in a digraph, i there is a cycle whose depth is indivisible
by 2i+1 in this digraph (Hsiung (2014), p. 26). What is more, this can be further
generalized to the Boolean paradoxes (Hsiung (2017)). From these example, we
can see how their paradoxicality conditions are related to some certain circularity.
The paradoxes in these examples, as elements in test group, are concrete examples
of locally nite paradoxes. The second main result about locally nite paradoxes
shows that all these paradoxes share a common property: the circularity depen-
dence. On the other hand, there are non-locally-nite examples which have no
3 Of course, this is merely a technical explanation, and for more philosophical motivations
about paradoxicality in a digraph, please refer to Hsiung (2009a).
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circularity dependence. The !-cycle liar and McGee's paradox (but not Yablo's
paradox or its variants) are such examples.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we rst give two ba-
sic notions: one is Leitgeib's dependence relation, and the other is the notion of
paradoxicality in a digraph. Then in Section 3, I generalize Leitgeib's notion of
self-reference by use of his dependence relation, and then prove the self-reference
of locally nite paradoxes. The circularity-dependence of locally nite paradoxes
and related results will be proved in section 4. As we will see, both proofs are an
application of Konig's innity lemma. In section 5, we turn to discuss some typical
non-locally-nite paradoxes. In the last section, we compare the present approach
to the self-reference with the one in the context of a sentential language.
Graph-theoretical Preliminaries. A digraph (or a relational frame) is a pair
hG;Ri, consisting of a non-empty set G, and a binary relation R on G.4 In a
digraph G = hW;R i, two points u and v in W are adjacent if either uiRui+1 or
ui+1Rui holds. Let u0, u1, . . . , ul be points in W . If ui and ui+1 are adjacent for
all 0  i < l, the sequence  = u0 u1 : : : ul is a walk from u0 to ul in G, u0 and ul
are two endpoints of , and l is the length of .
(a)  is closed , if its two endpoints are equal, i.e. u0 = ul.
(b)  is directed , if uiRui+1 for all 0  i < l.
(c)  is a cycle, if none of the points in  is repeated except that u0 = ul.
a loop is a directed cycle of length 1. An odd cycle is a cycle whose length is an
odd number. A directed acyclic digraph (DAG) is a digraph which has no directed
cycles (or equivalently, no closed directed walks, see Lemma 3).
Let  = u0 u1 : : : ul be a walk in G. A sub-walk of  is a walk from uaua+1 : : : ub
for some number a and b with 1  a  b  l. The inverse of  is the walk
ul ul 1 : : : u0, which is denote by  . Let  = v0v1 : : : vm be another walk in G.
If ul = v0, we can dene the concatenation of  and  (at ul), denoted by 
_, to
be w0w1 : : : wl+m, where wi = ui for 0  i  l and wi = vi l for l < i  l +m.
A digraph is connected, if any two dierent points are connected by some walk.
A connected component of a digraph is a sub-digraph of this digraph such that
it is connected but any proper super-digraph of it is not connected. A digraph is
minimal reexive, if it consists of a single point that bears the binary relation R
to itself. Clearly, all minimal reexive digraphs are isomorphic, and so we can say
the minimal reexive digraph.
2 Dependence relation and Paradoxicality
Let L be the rst-order language of the arithmetic, which includes S, +, 
and 0 as its non-logical symbols. Let L+ be the language obtained from L by
augmenting a distinguished unary predicate symbol T . Unless otherwise claimed,
when we say a formula, we mean a formula of L+. We will also use L+ to denote
the set of all sentences, and so by A 2 L+, we mean A is a sentence of L+. The
intended model of the language L is N = hN;0 ;+; ; 0 i, that is, the structure of
natural numbers. Correspondingly, for L+, we will only consider those models of
the form hN; Xi, where X  N is the extension of T . We can routinely dene
4 The digraph we dene is actually the digraph without parallel directed edges. This restric-
tion does not lose any generality for our purpose.
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VN;X(A), i.e., the truth value of A in the model hN; Xi. Since the ground model
N is always xed, we use VX(A) instead of VN;X(A). When VX(A) = T(F), we
will say A is true (false) for X. Sometimes, we also use X j=A for VX(A) = T. For
brevity, we use A  B to denote that A$ B is true for all X  N.
For a sentence A, we use pAq for the Godel's number of A, and pAq for the
corresponding numeral to the number pAq. But, to avoid too many complications,
we will often identify pAq with pAq, and identify a set  of sentences with the
set of the Godel's number of all sentences in . For example, we will use T pAq
instead of T
 
pAq

, and use V(A) instead of VfpBq j B2g(A). For any n  0,
dene inductively TnpAq as follows: T 0pAq = A and Tn+1pAq = T pTnpAqq for
n  0.
Our method of constructing the paradoxes is the standard one via Godel's
diagonal lemma. For instance, by use of Godel diagonalization, we can construct
the Liar sentence , which satises the equivalence   :T pq. More generally,
for any positive number n, we can construct a sentence n1 in L
+ such that
n1  :Tnpn1 q.
Leitgeb's dependence relation is dened as follows.
Denition 1 (Leitgeb (2005), p. 161) Let A be a sentence and  be a set of
sentence. We dene A depends on , if for any  1;  2  L+,
 \  1 =  \  2 ) V 1(A) = V 2(A):
Informally, A depends on , if and only if the truth value of A is determined by
whether the sentences of  are present in the extension of the truth predicate. An
equivalent denition is as follows: A depends on : if for any    L+, V  (A) =
V\  (A) (Leitgeb (2005), 161).
Lemma 1 (Leitgeb (2005), p. 161) For every sentence A of L+, we have:
(a) A depends on the set of all sentences of L+.
(b) If A depends on  and     , then A also depends on   .
(c) If A depends on both  and   , then A depends on  \   .
When A depends on , we will say  is a dependence set of A. We will use
D(A) to denote the family of all dependence sets of A. By Lemma 1, D(A) is a lter
and will be called the dependence lter of A. If D(A) is a principal lter, then it
contains a least set (about the set inclusion relation). In such a case, we will say A
essentially depends on this least set. As Leitgeb has pointed out, not every sentence
can essentially depends on a set. For instance, the sentence 8x9y(y > x^T py = yq)
depends on all conite subsets of the set fn = n j n 2 Ng, but it does not depends
on the empty set. Thus, this sentence does not essentially depends on any set.
Denition 2 (Beringer & Schindler (2015)) f is a choice function, if it is
a function from L+ to the powerset of L+, such that f(A) 2 D(A) for every
sentence A. For a choice function f , we dene a binary relation f on L+ as
follows: for all sentences A and B, Af B, i B 2 f(A). Let  be a set of sentence
and let f be a choice function. We will say h;f i is a dependence digraph of .5
5 In the digraph


;f

, f is actually the restriction relation f e . This is always
clear, and so the subscript is omitted.
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The present study is also closely related to the revision theory of truth which
has been mainly developed by Gupta & Belnap (1993). A basic notion of the
revision theory is the revision sequence, which was originally dened for arbitrarily
large length by Gupta (1982, p. 10) and Herzberger (1982, p. 68). But for the
present purpose, we only need to consider the revision sequences of length !.
Denition 3 (Gupta (1982); Herzberger (1982)) For a set  of sentences,
dene r = fA 2 L+ j  j=Ag. Dene a sequence 0, . . . , k, . . . as follows:
0 = , and k+1 = 
r
k for all k  0. This sequence is called the revision
sequence starting from .
We will generalize the notion of the revision sequence. To motivate the gen-
eralization, we recall that to say a set of sentences is paradoxical is to say there
is no interpretation of T such that Tarski's scheme T pAq $ A holds for all A in
this set. A precise denition is as follows.
Denition 4 A set  of sentences is paradoxical, if there is no   satisfying the
condition:   \  =   r \ . That is, there is no   such that for any A 2 ,
V  (T pAq) = V  (A).
From now on, we always use G to denote the digraph hW;Ri unless otherwise
claimed. See the end of section 1 for the denitions of the digraphs and related
notions.
Denition 5 (Hsiung (2009a), pp. 243-244) Let  be a set of sentences. t:
W !P(L+) is a revision mapping for  in G, if for all u; v 2W satisfying uR v,
t(v) \ = t(u)r \ (2)
 is paradoxical in G, if there is no revision mapping for  in G.
When  is the set of all sentences, W is the set of natural numbers and R is
the successor relation between natural numbers, a revision mapping t for  in G
is a revision sequence starting from the set t(0). And so the revision sequence is a
special instance of the revision mapping. And the notion of being paradoxical in
a digraph is also a generalization of being paradoxical. Actually, in the minimal
reexive frame, the equation (2) is collapsed to the equation of Denition 4, and
so  is paradoxical, i it is paradoxical in the minimal reexive digraph. Note also
that (2) is equivalent to
for all A 2 ; Vt(v)(T pAq) = Vt(u)(A):
And so the biconditional (2) is a formal representation of biconditional (1) in L+.
Hence, when a set of sentences is paradoxical in a digraph, we can think that it is
impossible to evaluate these sentences (without contradiction) in the digraph such
that scheme (1) holds for all of these sentences.
Denition 6 (Hsiung (2009a), pp. 248, 254) Let ;  be two sets of sen-
tences. Dene P   , if for any digraph G, whenever  is paradoxical in G,   is
also paradoxical in G. Dene P   , if P   and   P . Dene <P   , if
P   but  6P   .
Note that P is an equivalence relation. When P   , we will say  and  
have the same degree of paradoxicality . When <P   , we say  has a (strictly)
lower degree of paradoxicality than   .
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3 Locally nite Paradoxes and Self-reference
Leitgeb gave a denition of self-reference in terms of his dependence relation.
He dened that a sentence A is self-referential, if A belongs to any dependence set
of it, i.e., for any set  of sentences, whenever A depends on , A is an element
of  (Leitgeb (2005), p. 168). On the basis of Leitget's denition, we now provide
a more general notion of self-reference.
Denition 7 A sentence A is self-referential , if for all choice function f , there
are nitely many sentences A1, . . . , Ak such that Af A1f : : :f Akf A. In
case k = 0 (that is, Af A) for all f , A is directly self-referential ; otherwise, A is
indirectly self-referential.
Leitget's self-reference is actually equivalent to the present denition of direct
self-reference. To see this, only note that to say that for any set ,  2 D(A)
implies A 2 , is to say that for any choice function f , A 2 f(A), i.e., Af A.
Take the sentence n1 as an example again. For 1  i < n, let ni+1 = T pni q.
Then ni+1 essentially depends on fni g. We also have n1 essentially depends on
fnng since n1  :T pnnq. And so for any choice function f ,
n1 f nnf : : : f n3 f n2 f n1 :
When n = 1, we have n1 f n1 . It means that 11, i.e., the Liar sentence, is directly
self-referential. Now suppose n > 1, we consider a choice function, say f0, such
that f0 (
n
1 ) = fnng. Clearly, n1 does not belong to the set fnng. That means
n1 f0 n1 fails. It follows that when n > 1, n1 is self-referential but not directly
self-referential. In this case, n1 is indirectly self-referential. See Figure 1, where the
arrow stands for the relation f , and the points corresponding to the sentences
n2 , 
n
3 and so on are hollow since these sentences are merely auxiliary.
11
n = 1
: : :
n1 
n
2 
n
3
nn
n > 1
Fig. 1: Self-reference of n1
In the above example, we nd it is more convenient to consider the set fni j 1 
i  ng rather than the single sentence n1 . The set fni j 1  i  ng will be called
`n-cycle liar', denoted by n.6 We now introduce the notion of self-reference for a
set of sentences.
6 The n-cycle liar is called the `Liar cycle' in Leitgeb (2005, p. 164). It is also known as
`n-liar'. Generally, we can dene -liar for all ordinals . Herzberger (1982, pp. 74-75) and
Yablo (1985, p. 340). The case for  = ! will be given in section 5. But we will use the term
`!-cycle liar' rather than `!-liar', because the latter may cause confusing: for instance, the
term `!-liar' sometimes is also used for Yablo's paradox. See Yablo (2004, p. 140).
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Denition 8 A set of sentences is self-referential , i each dependence digraph of
it contains at least a closed directed walk. In particular, it is directly self-referential ,
i each dependence digraph of it contains at least a loop.
The following notions are useful to study the self-reference of sets of sentences.
Denition 9 Let  be a set of sentences.
(a)  is normal , if every sentence of  essentially depends on some set.
(b)  is locally nite, if every sentence of  has a nite dependence set.
Lemma 2 (a) If A depends on a nite set, then A essentially depends on a subset
of this set.
(b) Any locally nite set of sentences is normal.
Proof. (a) Suppose A depends on a nite set . Let D be the set of all the
subsets   of  such that A depends on   . By the hypothesis,  2 D, and so D
is non-empty. Let  0 be the intersection of all the sets of D. Since  is nite, D
is also nite. By (c) of Lemma 1, A depends on  0. Now for every set   , if A
depends on   , then by (c) of Lemma 1 again,   \ belongs to D. It follows that
 0    \, and  0    . Consequently, A essentially depends on  0.
(b) is immediate from (a). ut
The following two graph-theoretical results are useful in studying the self-
reference of a locally nite set of sentences.
Lemma 3 A digraph contains a closed directed walk, i it contains a directed
cycle.
The proof of this lemma is omitted, since we will late prove a similar but
stronger result (see (b) of Lemma 5). By this lemma, we can see a set of sentences
is self-referential, i none of its dependence digraphs is a DAG. A basic property
of a nite DAG is that its points can be linearly ordered such that whenever there
is an edge from a point u to another v, then u comes after v in the ordering. The
relevant notions are as follows.
Denition 10 Let G = hW;Ri be a digraph. A point u in W is a sink of G, if for
any v in W , uR v always fails. A function g :W ! N is a topological sorting of G,
if for any u and v in W , whenever uR v, g(v) < g(u).7
Lemma 4 (a) Any nite DAG contains at least a sink.
(b) Any nite DAG has a topological sorting.
Proof. (a) Let G = hW;Ri be a nite DAG. Assume no point of G is a sink,
then we can nd an innite sequence of points in W , u0 u1 u2 : : :, such that
u0Ru1Ru2R : : :. But W contains only nitely many points, there must be two
repeated points in the above sequence. And so there is at least a closed directed
walk in G, but this is contradictory with the hypothesis that G is a DAG.
(b) Let G0 = G, and by (a), we can nd a sink in G0, and let it be u0. Let G1 be
the digraph obtained by deleting u0 from G0. Then G1 is still a nite DAG. And
7 The ordering we give here by the function g is the converse of the usual topological sorting
of a digraph (see for instance, Cormen et al. (2009), p. 612). Such a ordering streamlines our
induction in the proof of Theorem 1.
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so, we can nd a sink in G1, namely u1. This process can be iterated indenitely.
In general, for any k  0, let uk be a sink of Gk, and let Gk+1 be the digraph
obtained by deleting uk from Gk. Since W is nite, we can nd a least number m
such that Gm+1 is empty. In that case, W = fui j 0  i  mg. Note that for any
0  i; j  m, if i  j, then uiRuj fails (otherwise ui is not a sink of Gi). Thus,
if uiRuj , then j < i. Now dene g such that g(ui) = i for 0  i  m. Then g is
clearly a topological sorting of G. ut
Theorem 1 If a nite set of sentences is paradoxical, then it is self-referential.
Proof. Assume  is not self-referential, then there exists a dependence digraph of
, namely G = h; f i, which is a DAG. We will show that  is not paradoxical.
By (b) of Lemma 4, G has a topological sorting, namely g. Letm be the greatest
value of g. Dene 0k inductively as follows: 
0
0 = , and for any k  0,
0k+1 =

A 2  j V0k(A) = T
	
:
For brevity, 0k(A) is a shorthand for V0k(A). We claim that for all 0  l  m
and for all A 2 , if g(A)  l, then for all k  l, 0k+1(A) = 0k(A). If this
claim is true, then in particular, we x l = m, and then get for all A 2 ,
0k+1(A) = 
0
k(A) whenver k  m. That is to say, the sequence


0k j k 2 N

actually gets to a xed point after stage m. It follows immediately that for every
A 2 , 0m+1(T pAq) = 0m+1(A). Hence,  is not paradoxical.
We prove the above claim by induction on l. When g(A)  0, A must be a sink
in G. Then by denition of the choice function,  \ f(A) = ?, otherwise Af B
for some B 2 , but this is impossible since A is a sink in G. And so for all k  0,
0k+1 \ f(A) = 0k \ f(A) = ?, and then by denition 1, 0k+1(A) = 0k(A).
Next, suppose g(A)  l + 1, then for any B 2 , provided Af B, g(B)  l.
Then by inductive hypothesis, for all k  l, 0k+1(B) = 0k(B). We notice f(A) =
fB j Af Bg, and so for all B 2  \ f(A) and for all k  l, B 2 0k+2, i
B 2 0k+1. That means for all k  l, 0k+2 \ f(A) = 0k+1 \ f(A). Hence, by
denition of dependence relation again, 0k+2(A) = 
0
k+1(A) holds for all k  l.
Therefore, for all k  l+1, 0k+1(A) = 0k(A). As a result, for all A 2 , whenever
g(A)  l, we can get for all k  l, 0k+1(A) = 0k(A). The claim is proved. ut
Recall that a tree is a partial order hT ; <i satisfying the following conditions:
(i) T contains a unique minimal element (the root of T ); (ii) For any  2 T , the
set f0 2 T j 0 < g is a nite subset of T that is totally ordered by <. For
brevity, f0 2 T j 0 < g is denoted by pdT (). The height of  is dened to be
the size of pdT (). For n 2 N, the n-th level of T is the set of all  2 T such that
the height of  is equal to n. 0 is an immediate successor of , if  < 0 and the
height of 0 is the height of  plus 1. A tree is nitely branching, if every point in
the tree has only nitely many (possibly zero) immediate successors. A branch of
a tree is a maximal totally ordered subset of T . Konig's innity lemma says that if
a tree is innite and nitely branching, then it has an innite branch. For a proof
of this lemma, see for instance Just & Weese (1997, p. 31).
Theorem 2 If a locally nite set of sentences is paradoxical, it is self-referential.
Proof. Let  be an innite but locally nite set of sentences. Suppose it is not
self-referential. We will use Konig's innity lemma to prove  is not paradoxical.
What Paradoxes Depend on 11
By the supposition, there is a choice function f such that the dependence digraph
G = h;f i is a DAG. Since  is locally nite, there is a choice function f 0
such that for all A 2 , f 0(A) is a nite set. Dene a function f 00 as follows:
f 00(A) = f(A) \ f 0(A). By (c) of Lemma 1, f 00 is also a choice function. And for
all A 2 , f 00(A) is a nite set. Furthermore, h;f 00i is a DAG, since it is a
sub-digraph of G. Now by replacing f with f 00, we can make a further supposition
about the original f : for all A 2 , f(A) is a nite set.
Let  = fAk j k 2 Ng. For brevity, we use k for the set fAi j i < kg, and
Nk for fi 2 N j i < kg. We now create a tree as follows. For k 2 N, let us say
 : Nk ! fT;Fg is a k-sequence, if there exists a subset of k, namely  k, such
that for all i < k, (i) V k (T pAiq) = V k (Ai) and (ii) (i) = T, i Ai 2  k. k will
be called the length of , denoted by jj. Let T be the set of all the k-sequences
for k 2 N. Dene a binary relation < on T as follows:  < 0, i jj < j0j, and
for all i < jj, (i) = 0(i). It can be easily seen that hT ; <i is a tree with the
0-sequence (the empty sequence) as its root.
For any k  0, by Theorem 1, there exists a set  k  k, such that for all
i < k, V k (T pAiq) = V k (Ai). Dene k : Nk ! fT;Fg such that k(i) = T,
i Ai 2  k. Then k is an element in the kth level of hT ; <i. Thus, hT ; <i is
an innite tree. Furthermore, hT ; <i is nitely branching (it is actually a binary
tree). Now by Konig's innity lemma, the tree hT ; <i has an innite branch. We
put k to be the restriction of this innite branch up to the k-th level of the tree.
Specically, we can choose an innite branch  of hT ; <i, and let k =  Nk .
Let g =
S
k0 

k, and let   = fAk j g(k) = Tg. We prove that for all k  0,
V  (T pAkq) = V  (Ak).
For any k  0, by the supposition that f(Ak) is a nite set, we can choose a
number nk such that k < nk and f(Ak)  nk . In order to prove V  (T pAkq) =
V  (Ak), we notice that by denition of V  , V  (T pAkq) = T, i Ak 2   ; by
denition of   , Ak 2   , i g (k) = T; by denition of g and the fact that k < nk,
g (k) = T, i nk (k) = T; by denition of 

k, 

nk (k) = T, i Ak 2  nk ; by
denition of V nk , Ak 2  nk , i V nk (T pAkq) = T; and by condition for  nk ,V nk (T pAkq) = T, i V nk (Ak) = T. Thus it suces to prove that V nk (Ak) =
T, i V  (Ak) = T.
Note that  nk ( nk) is the set corresponding to the nk-sequence nk . Since
Ak depends on f(Ak), in order to show the last equivalence in the preceding
paragraph, it is sucient to prove  nk \ f(Ak) =   \ f(Ak). First, suppose Ai 2
 nk , then 

nk (i) = T. Hence, g(i) = T, and so Ai 2   . We thus obtain  nk    .
It follows  nk \ f(Ak)    \ f(Ak). And the converse is also true because f(Ak)
is already included in the set nk by our choice of nk: provided Ai 2   \ f(Ak),
then i < nk and g(i) = T, and so 

nk(i) = T, and nally we have Ai 2  nk . ut
4 Locally nite Paradoxes and Circularity-dependence
In this section, we will prove that the locally nite sets of sentences are para-
doxical only in those frames containing a proper cycle. Thus, these locally nite
paradoxes do depend on circularity in the following sense: they can generate some
contradiction only if the digraphs by which we evaluate them satisfy some circu-
larity condition.
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Denition 11 (Hsiung (2014), p. 26) Let G = hG;Ri be a digraph. Dene a
mapping dG from the set of all walks in G to the set of natural numbers as follows:
for any world u 2W , dG(u) = 0; and for any walk  = u0 u1 : : : ul ul+1 (l  0),
dG() =

dG (u0 u1 : : : ul) + 1; if ul+1Rul;
dG (u0 u1 : : : ul)  1; otherwise.
dG() will be called the depth of  in G. We suppress the parameter G from dG
when no confusion arises. A cycle in a digraph is improper , if its depth is zero;
otherwise it is proper .
Lemma 5 Let G = hW;Ri be a digraph. Let , 0, and 1 be walks in G.
(a) If  = _0 1, then d() = d(0) + d(1).
(b) G contains a proper cycle, i it contains a closed walk of non-zero depth.
Proof. Both (a) and the necessity of (b) are obvious, and we only prove the
suciency of (b). It suces to prove that for any closed walk  of non-zero depth
in G,  has a sub-walk which is a proper cycle. The proof is by mathematical
induction on the length l of . The case of l = 1 is apparently true, since a closed
walk of length 1 is also a cycle.
For l > 1, suppose  = u0 u1 : : : ul. If all points in  are distinct except that
u0 = ul,  is a cycle in itself. Otherwise, we can choose two points ui0 and uj0
in  such that 0  i0 < j0  l, ui0 = uj0 , but either i0 6= 0 or j0 6= l. Consider
the sub-walk from ui0 to uj0 of . Let it be 1. At the same time, consider the
concatenation of the sub-walk from u0 to ui0 and the sub-walk from uj0 to ul at
the point ui0 (or uj0). Let it be 2. Both 1 and 2 are closed and their lengths
are less than l. At the same time, since d(1) + d(2) = d() and d() 6= 0, either
d(1) 6= 0 or d(2) 6= 0. So by inductive hypothesis, either 1 or 2 has a sub-walk
which is a proper cycle. Such a cycle is also a sub-walk of . ut
Lemma 6 Let G = hW;Ri be a digraph without any proper cycle.
(a) If  is a walk in G, then d( ) =  d().
(b) In G, all walks with the same endpoints have the same depth.
Proof. For (a), let  = u0 u1 : : : ul, then for any 0  k < l, either uk Ruk+1
or uk+1Ruk, but not both. From this, d(
 ) =  d() can be easily proved by
mathematical induction on the length of . To prove (b), we x arbitrarily two
points u and v inW . Let 0 and 1 be two walks from u to v. Assume d(0) 6= d(1),
and consider the walk _0 
 
1 . By (a), d
 
_0 
 
1

= d (0)  d (1) 6= 0. Thus, _0  1
is a closed walk of non-zero depth in G. By (b) of Lemma 5, G contains a proper
cycle, a contradiction. ut
Theorem 3 If a nite set of sentences is paradoxical in a digraph, then there is
some proper cycle in this digraph.
Proof. Let  be a nite set, and let G = hW;Ri is a digraph without any proper
cycle. We show  is not paradoxical in G. Note that  is paradoxical in G, i
it is so in some connected component of G. We can suppose that G is connected
without loss of generality.
What Paradoxes Depend on 13
Dene 0k as in the proof of Theorem 1. Since  is a nite set, there exist
numbers m and l such that m < l and 0m = 0l. Put p = l  m. Now x a point
in G, namely u0. For any point u in G, by (b) of Lemma 6, all walks from u0
to u has the same depth. Let d(u) be the depth of some (any) walk from u0 to
u. Now dene a mapping t : W ! P  L+ as follows: if d(u)  k (mod p) and
0  k < p, t(u) = 0m+k. We show t is a revision mapping for  in G, and so 
is not paradoxical in G.
Suppose u and v are two points in W satisfying uR v and suppose d(u) 
k (mod p). Then d(v)  k + 1 (mod p). We consider two cases. In case k + 1 < p,
then t(u) = 0m+k and t(v) = 
0
m+k+1. From this, we can easily obtain t(v)\ =
t(u)r \ . Hence, t is a revision mapping for  in G. In case k + 1 = p, then
t(u) = 0m+k = 
0
l 1 and t(v) = 
0
m = 
0
l. We see this case can be similarly
proved as the above case. ut
Theorem 4 If a set of sentences is paradoxical in a nite digraph, then there is
some proper cycle in this digraph.
Proof. Suppose  is an innite set of sentences, and G = hW;Ri is a nite
digraph without any proper cycle. We show  is not paradoxical in G. The proof,
like the one of Theorem 2, is an application of Konig's innity lemma.
Let  = fAk j k 2 Ng. We still use k for the set fAi j i < kg, and Nk
for fi 2 N j i < kg. We now create a tree as follows. For k 2 N, let us say
 : Nk !P(W ) is a k-sequence of worlds, if there exists a revision mapping t for
k in G such that u 2 (i), i Ai 2 t(u). Let T be the set of all the k-sequences of
worlds for k 2 N. Dene a binary relation < on T as follows:  < 0, i jj < j0j,
and for all i < jj, (i) = 0(i). It can be easily veried that hT ; <i is a tree.
For any k  0, by Theorem 3, there exists a revision mapping tk for k in G.
Dene k : Nk ! P(W ) such that k(i) = fu 2 W j Ai 2 tk(u)g. Then k is an
element in the kth level of hT ; <i. Thus, hT ; <i is an innite tree. What is more,
since W is a nite set, hT ; <i is nitely branching. This is the place where we use
the niteness of the digraph G. Now by Konig's innity lemma, the tree hT ; <i
has an innite branch. We put k to be the restriction of this innite branch up
to the k-th level of the tree. Let g =
S
k0 

k, and dene a mapping t
 on W as
follows: t(u) = fAk j u 2 g(k)g. We prove that t is a revision mapping for k in
G.
Just as we do in the proof of Theorem 2, for any k  0, we can choose a
number nk such that k < nk and f(Ak)  nk . To prove t is a revision mapping
for k in G, we only need to prove that for any Ak 2  and for any u; v 2 W
with uR v, Ak 2 t(v), i t(u) j=Ak. For this, rst note that by denition of t,
Ak 2 t(v), i v 2 g(k); by denition of g and the fact that k < nk, v 2 g(k), i
v 2 nk (k); by denition of nk , v 2 nk (k), i Ak 2 tnk (v); and by denition
of tnk , Ak 2 tnk (v), i tnk(u) j=Ak. Now it suces to prove that tnk(u) j=Ak, i
t(u) j=Ak.
Note that tnk is a revision mapping for nk in G, which witnesses that nk
is a nk-sequence of worlds. The last equivalence in the preceding paragraph holds
because Ak depends on f(Ak) and t

nk(u) \ f(Ak) = t(u) \ f(Ak). First, we
can get tnk(u) \ f(Ak)  t(u) \ f(Ak) from the easy fact that tnk(u)  t(u).
Conversely, suppose Ai 2 t(u) \ f(Ak), then on one hand, by our choice of nk,
i < nk, and on the other hand, by the denition of t
, u 2 g(i). Thus, u 2 nk (i).
It follows Ai 2 tnk(u). We obtain tnk(u) \ f(Ak)  t(u) \ f(Ak). ut
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Theorem 5 If a locally nite set of sentences is paradoxical in a digraph, then
there is some proper cycle in this digraph.
Proof. Suppose  is an innite but locally nite set of sentences, and G = hW;Ri
is a digraph without any proper cycle. We show  is not paradoxical in G. Again,
the proof is an application of Konig's innity lemma.
We need to consider simultaneously two innite parameters: one is the set 
and the other is the digraph G. Correspondingly, the tree we must create to apply
Konig's innity lemma is more complicated than the one in the proof of Theorem
4. First note that if the desired result holds for some (or any) countably innite
sub-digraph of G, it must also hold for the whole G. So we can suppose without
loss of generality that G is countably innite. Let  = fAk j k 2 Ng, and let
W = fwk j k 2 Ng. For brevity, we use k for the set fAi j i < kg, and Wk for
the set fwi j i < kg. Let Gk be the restriction of G to Wk. Now we construct a
tree as follows. For k 2 N, let us say  : Nk !P(Wk) is a k-sequence of worlds, if
there exists a revision mapping t for k in Gk such that u 2 (i), i Ai 2 t(u). Let
T be the set of all the k-sequences of worlds for k 2 N. Dene a binary relation <
on T as follows:  < 0, i jj < j0j, and for all i < jj, (i) = 0(i) \Wjj.
We verify that hT ; <i is a tree. First, it can be easily veried that T is (strictly)
partially ordered by <, and the 0-sequence of worlds (i.e., empty sequence) is its
the root. The details are omitted. Next, we must verify that for each 0 2 T ,
pdT (0) is a nite set which is totally ordered by <. To see this point, we rst
notice that whenever  < 0, jj < j0j. We also can easily see that there are at
most 2k
2
function from Nk toP(Wk). Therefore, if j0j = k, then there are at mostPm
k=0 2
k2 elements in the set pdT (0). Thus, pdT (0) is nite. Next, we suppose
1; 2 < 
0, we show either 1  2 or 2  1. Without loss of generality, we
suppose j1j  j2j. For any i < j1j, we have the following equations:
1(i) = 
0(i) \Wj1j (1 < 0)
= 0(i) \Wj2j \Wj1j (Wj1j Wj2j)
= 2(i) \Wj1j (2 < 0)
By the above result, if j1j = j2j, we have 1 = 2; if j1j < j2j, we have 1 < 2.
As a result, we can conclude that hT ; <i is a tree.
For any k  0, by Theorem 3, there exists a revision mapping tk for k
in Gk. Dene k : Nk ! P(Wk) such that k(i) = fu 2 Wk j Ai 2 tk(u)g.
Then k is an element in the kth level of hT ; <i. Thus, hT ; <i is an innite tree.
What is more, since there are at most 2k
2
elements in the kth level of hT ; <i,
hT ; <i is nitely branching. Now by Konig's innity lemma, the tree hT ; <i has
an innite branch. We put k to be the restriction of this innite branch to the
k-th level of the tree. Let g =
S
k0 

k, and dene a mapping t
 on W as follows:
t(u) = fAk j u 2 g(k)g. We prove that for all t is a revision mapping for  in G.
To prove t is a revision mapping for  in G, we only need to prove that for
any Ak 2  and for any wl; wm 2W with wlRwm, Ak 2 t(wm), i t(wl) j=Ak.
For this, rst, just as we do in the proof of Theorem 2, we can choose a number n
such that l;m; k < n and f(Ak)  n. Note that n depends on not only k but also
l and m, and so we write n (or more informative but cumbersome nl;m;k) instead
of nk.
What Paradoxes Depend on 15
Now by denition of t, Ak 2 t(wm), i wm 2 g(k); and by denition of g and
the fact that k;m < n, the latter is equivalent to wm 2 n (k), which is equivalent
to Ak 2 tn (wm) by denition of n. And by denition of tn and the fact that
l < n, Ak 2 tn (wm), i tn(wl) j=Ak. Finally, it suces to prove that tn(wl) j=Ak,
i t(wl) j=Ak.
Note that tn is a revision mapping for n in Gn, which witnesses that n is
a n-sequence of worlds. The last equivalence in the preceding paragraph holds
because Ak depends on f(Ak) and t

n(wl) \ f(Ak) = t(wl) \ f(Ak). First, we
can get tn(wl) \ f(Ak)  t(wl) \ f(Ak) from the easy fact that tn(wl)  t(wl).
Conversely, suppose Ai 2 t(wl) \ f(Ak), then on one hand, by our choice of n,
i < n, and on the other hand, by the denition of t, wl 2 g(i). We now claim
wl 2 n (i) (we must say this is not immediate). If we obtain this claim, then we
know Ai 2 tn(wl), and so we can conclude tn(wl) \ f(Ak)  t(wl) \ f(Ak).
To verify the above claim, we rst choose a number n0 such that i; n < n0 and
wl 2 n0(i). The existence of n0 is guaranteed by the fact that wl 2 g(i). By the
denition of k and the fact n < n
0, we have n < n0 . But jnj = n, and then by
the denition of the tree relation <, we know n(i) = n0(i) \Wn. But l < n, we
know wl 2Wn. Then wl 2 n0(i) \Wn, that is, wl 2 n(i). ut
Denition 12 (Hsiung (2014), p. 35) A set of sentences is said to have cir-
cularity dependence, if it is not paradoxical in any digraph unless this digraph
contains some proper cycle. A set of sentences is said to have digraph compact-
ness, if whenever it is paradoxical in a digraph, it must be paradoxical in some
nite sub-digraph of this digraph.
Like the denition of self-reference, the above one of circularity-dependence is
also used to formulate the informal notion of circularity about sentences. But, the
two kinds of circularity have dierent meanings. As we all know, self-reference is
essentially a semantical characteristic of sentences. And when we say a paradox is
self-referential, it is the sentences of the paradox that are so. By contrast, when
we say a paradox has circularity dependence, the object that has the feature of
circularity is the digraphs in which this paradox is paradoxical. In other words,
circularity-dependence is about digraphs rather than about sentences. It is a purely
graph-theoretical notion. Circularity-dependence should not be confused with self-
reference.
The following are immediate from Theorem 3 and 5.
Corollary 1 Both the nite sets of sentences and the locally nite sets of sen-
tences have the circularity dependence and the digraph compactness.
5 Some Non Locally Finite Paradoxes
In this section, we rst give some paradoxical examples which are not self-
referential and then some ones which are paradoxical in a digraph without any
proper cycle. Of course, all of them are non-locally-nite paradoxes.
First, we consider Yablo's paradox, which consists of countably innite sen-
tences (0), (1), . . . , such that for all n 2 N,
(n)  8x (x > n! :T p( _x)q) ;
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where n is the term SS : : : S0 (n occurrences of S), x > n is an abbreviation
for the formula 9z (x = n+Sz), and _x is Feferman's dot notion which allows the
scope of the quantiers 8x covers the formula (x), even though (x) hides behind
a closed term.8 A variant of Yablo's paradox is as follows: 0(0), 0(1), . . . , such
that for all n 2 N,
0(n)  8x  x > n! 9y  y > x ^ :T p0( _y)q :
We will use n for (n) and 
0
n for 
0(n).
Example 1 Neither Yablo's paradox fn j n 2 Ng nor its variant

0n j n 2 N
	
is
self-referential.
Proof. It can be easily veried that for any n 2 N, n essentially depends on
the set fk j k > ng (See Figure 2). Note that this fact also shows that Yablo's
paradox is not locally nite. Now assume fn j n 2 Ng is self-referential, then
consider the choice function f , which satises that f(n) = fk j k > ng for all
n 2 N. By denition 8, there is a closed directed walk in the dependence digraph
hfn j n 2 Ng;f i. That is, for some numbers n0, n1, . . . , nk, we have n0 = nk
and ni f ni+1 for 0  i < k. By the condition of f , ni+1 must belong to the set
fk j k > nig. Thus, for 0  i < k, we have ni+1 > ni. Consequently, nk > n0, a
contradiction!
: : :
0 1 2 3
Fig. 2: Non-self-reference of Yablo's paradox
For the variant

0n j n 2 N
	
, rst note that for any n 2 N, 0n depends on the
set f0k j k > n + 1g. Then we can consider the choice function f which assigns
0n to f0k j k > n+ 1g. The corresponding relation f satises: if 0mf 0n, then
m < n. As above, we can similarly prove

0n j n 2 N
	
is non-self-referential. ut
There are other variants of Yablo's paradox. For this, we notice that the de-
nitional equivalences of

0n j n 2 N
	
can be uniformly represented as follows:
0(x)  8y > x 9z > y :Tp0 ( _z)q:
In this sense, The paradox

0n j n 2 N
	
can be seen as a `89-unwinding' variant
of Yablo's paradox. Now for the quantiers Q1, . . . , Qn, we can similarly give
a Q1 : : : Qn-unwinding variant of Yablo's paradox.
9 A basic fact about all the
Q1 : : : Qn-unwinding variants of Yablo's paradox is that only four kinds are not
8 For more details about Feferman's dot notion, see for instance Halbach (2011, p. 32).
9 The dual of Yablo's paradox, that is, the 9-unwinding variant, was rst given by Cook
(2004, p. 771). And the dual of the 89-unwinding variant, i.e., the 98-unwinding variant,
was put forward by Yablo (2004, p. 144). Yablo's paradox and the above two variants were
generalized in Schlenker (2007a). The notion of unwinding was rst formulated by Cook (2004,
p. 770) and the present nomenclature `Q1 : : : Qn-unwinding' comes from Cook (2014, p. 155).
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logically equivalent to each other: the 8n-unwinding, 9n-unwinding, 89-unwinding,
and 98-unwinding variants.10 As above, it can be similarly proved that all these
variants of Yablo's paradox are non-self-referential.11
Next, we turn to nd the examples that can be paradoxical in a digraph without
proper cycles. First note that Yablo's paradox (or its 89-unwinding variant) is not
such an example, even though it is not locally nite. Actually, we can prove that
Yablo's paradox even has the same degree of paradoxicality as the Liar paradox:
Yablo's paradox is paradoxical in a digraph, i the Liar is so in this digraph. But
the Liar is paradoxical in a digraph, i this digraph contains some odd cycles.12
Thus, Yablo's paradox cannot be paradoxical in a digraph without proper cycles.
Another known non-locally-nite paradox is the !-cycle liar. By Godel's diago-
nal lemma, for 0    !, we can construct sentences ! such that !0  :T p!!q,
!k+1  T p!k q (k 2 N), and !!  8xTp!_xq. The set f! j 0    !g is a para-
dox. It can be called the !-cycle liar.13 For any k 2 N, !k+1 essentially depends
on the set f!k g. For this, only note that !k+1 does not depend on the empty set
and for any    L+,
V  (T p!k q) = V \f!k g(T p
!
k q):
Similarly, !0 essentially depends on the set f!!g. It follows that for any choice
function f , !0f!!f!0 . That means any dependence digraph of the !-cycle liar
contains a closed directed walk. Consequently, the !-cycle liar is a self-referential
paradox. However, the !-cycle liar is not locally nite. For this, we show the
sentence !! essentially depends on the innite set  = f!k j k 2 Ng. Actually,
since !k 2   for all k 2 N i !k 2   \ for all k 2 N, we can get V  (T p!k q) = T
for all k 2 N i V \ (T p!k q) = T for all k 2 N, that is,
V  (8xTp!_xq) = V \ (8xTp!_xq) ;
and we get !! depends on . It can be easily veried that 
!
! does not depends
on any proper subset of . See Figure 3.
Denition 13 (Hsiung (2014), p. 27) A digraph hG;Ri is grounded , i for
any point in the domain G, the depths of the walks starting from that point are
bounded from above (or more formally, there is a number N , such that d() 
N holds for all walks  starting from that point). Otherwise, hG;Ri is called
ungrounded .
10 See Theorem 3.3.2 in Cook (2014).
11 There are other variants of Yablo's paradox. For instance, Butler (2017) gave a recipe
for constructing what he called `innitely non*-variants' of Yablo's paradox. There are even
continuum-many such variants, whose formalized counterparts in L+ (if any) can be proved
to be non-self-referential by the similar method we use in Example 1. By the way, Butler also
asserted that some of these paradoxes are non-self-referential. But his criterion, proposed by
Priest (1997), is whether a circular predicate is involved in the construction of a paradox.
12 For details of the two results, see Hsiung (2013) and Hsiung (2009a) respectively.
13 For any transnite limit ordinal , we can similar set up the -cycle liar. See Herzberger
(1982, pp. 74-75) and Yablo (1985, p. 340). Of course, only those -cycle liars consisting of
countably sentences can be formalized in L+. Surprisingly, all of those transnite -cycle liars
have the same degree of paradoxicality. See Hsiung (2014, p. 36). Thus, all of these paradoxes
are examples that can be paradoxical in a digraph without proper cycles.
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: : :!0
!1 
!
2 
!
3
!!
Fig. 3: Self-reference of the !-cycle liar
Recall that a digraph hG;Ri is well-founded, if there is no innite sequence
w0, w1, w2, ... of elements of G such that wk+1Rxk for every natural number k.
The following lemma is obvious, and its proof is omitted.
Lemma 7 (a) Any grounded digraph is well-founded.
(b) Any grounded digraph contains no proper cycle.
Not all well-founded digraphs are grounded. For instance, let G be a frame
whose domain contains three points u0, u1 and u2, such that R satises only
u0Ru1, u0Ru2 and u2Ru1. G is clearly well-founded but the lengths of the walks
starting from u0 have no upper bound. The converse of (b) of Lemma 7 is also not
true. The set of natural numbers with the predecessor relation as its ordering is a
ungrounded digraph which contains no proper cycle.
Theorem 6 (Hsiung (2014), p. 26) The !-cycle liar is paradoxical in a di-
graph, i this digraph is ungrounded.
By Theorem 6, the !-cycle liar is paradoxical in the digraph whose domain is
the set of natural numbers and whose ordering is the predecessor relation. As we
just mentioned, this digraph contains no proper cycles, and so we nd a paradox
which can be paradoxical in a digraph without proper cycles. By the way, seeing
Theorem 5, we may conjecture that if a set of sentences is paradoxical in a locally
nite digraph, then there is some proper cycle in this digraph. But this is denitely
wrong, because the digraph we just mentioned is a locally nite digraph in which
!-cycle liar is paradoxical, but this digraph, as we have known, contains no proper
cycle at all.
Note that the indexes of the sentences in the !-cycle liar are involved in the
transnite ordinal !. But as we will see below, the use of the transnite ordinal
is not essential: labeling only by the natural numbers, we can construct a similar
paradox with the same degree of paradoxicality. For this purpose, we now introduce
two paradoxes. By Godel's diagonal lemma, we can nd a sentence 0 such that
0  9x:TS _xp0q.14 For any k 2 N, let k+1 = T pkq. It can be easily seen that
the set fk j k 2 Ng is paradoxical. Let us call it `McGee's paradox'. McGee's
paradox is not locally nite, as 0 essentially depends on the set fk j k > 0g.
And since 1 essentially depends on f0g, McGee's paradox is self-referential (see
Figure 4). Similarly, let 00 be the sentence satisfying 
0
0  8x:TS _xp00q and call
the set

0k j k 2 N
	
`the dual of McGee's paradox'.
14 The sentence 0 was rst introduced by McGee (1985, p. 400).
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: : :0
1 2 3
Fig. 4: Self-reference of McGee's paradox
Lemma 8 The !-cycle liar, McGee's paradox and its dual all have the same degree
of paradoxicality.
Proof. We rst prove McGee's paradox is paradoxical in G, i its dual is so in G.
Suppose t is a revision mapping for McGee's paradox in G, we dene a mapping
t0 : W ! P(L+) as follows: t0(u) = 0k j k =2 t(u)	. We verify t0 is a revision
mapping for the dual of McGee's paradox in G. Fix arbitrarily two points u and
v with uR v. First notice t0(v) j=T p0kq, i 0k 2 t0(v). Then by denition of t0,
0k 2 t0(v), i k =2 t(v) which is clearly equivalent to t(v) 6j=T pkq. We get
t0(v) j=T p0kq () t(v) 6j=T pkq: (3)
Next we prove
t0(u) j=0k () t(u) 6j=k: (4)
Case 1: k = i+ 1 (i  0). Then as we prove (3), we can show t0(u) j=T p0iq,
i t(i) 6j=T piq. Then, (4) follows immediately.
Case 2: k = 0. We notice 0  9x:T p _xq and 00  8x:T p0_xq. Then, we
have t0(u) j=00, i for all k 2 N, t0(u) j=:T p0kq. But note that t0(u) j=:T p0kq, i
0k =2 t0(u). Again, by denition of t0, 0k =2 t0(u), i k 2 t(u) which is equivalent
to t(u) j=T pkq. Thus, t0(u) j=00, i for all k 2 N, t(u) j=T pkq, and we can
obtain t0(u) j=00, i t(u) 6j=0. Now, (4) follows.
Since t is a revision mapping for McGee's paradox in G, t(v) j=T pkq, i
t(u) j=k. By (3) and (4), t0(v) j=T p0kq, i t0(u) j=0k. t0 is a revision mapping
for the dual of McGee's paradox in G. In conclusion, we have shown that if McGee's
paradox is non-paradoxical in G, its dual is so in G. By symmetry, the converse
also holds.
Next we prove the !-cycle liar is paradoxical in G, i fk j k 2 Ng is so in G.
Suppose t is a revision mapping for the !-cycle liar in G, dene t0 as follows:
t0(u) = f0 j !! =2 t(u)g [ fk+1 j !k 2 t(u); k  0g :
We show t0 is a revision mapping for fk j k 2 Ng in G. For any u; v 2 W with
uR v, we need to verify that t0(v) j=T pkq, i t0(u) j=k. We consider two cases.
Case 1: k = 0. We notice t0(v) j=T p0q, i 0 2 t0(v). And by denition of
t0, 0 2 t0(v), i !! =2 t(v) which is equivalent to t(v) 6j=T p!!q. At the same time,
since 0  9x:T p _xq, we have t0(u) j=0, i for some n  0, t0(u) j=:T pn+1q
(i.e., n+1 =2 t0(u)). Now, by denition of t0 again, n+1 =2 t0(u), i !n =2 t(u)
which is equivalent to t(u) 6j=T p!nq. Thus, we get t0(u) j=0, i for some n  0,
t(u) 6j=T p!nq. That is to say, t0(u) j=0, i t(u) 6j=8xT p!_xq. But !!  8xT p!_xq,
and hence t0(u) j=0, i t(u) 6j=!!. We also know t(v) j=T p!!q, i t(u) j=!!. To
sum up, we obtain t0(v) j=T p0q, i t0(u) j=0.
20 Ming Hsiung
Case 2: k = i+ 1 (i  0). On one hand, t0(v) j=T pi+1q, i i+1 2 t0(v). By
denition of t0, i+1 2 t0(v), i !i 2 t(v) which is equivalent to t(v) j=T p!i q. On
the other hand, t0(u) j=i+1, i t0(u) j=T piq which is equivalent to i 2 t0(u).
When i = 0, by denition of t0, i 2 t0(u), i !! =2 t(u), which is equivalent
to t(u) 6j=:T p!!q. Since !i  T p!!q, we can deduce i 2 t0(u), i t(u) j=!i .
When i = j + 1 (j  0), by denition of t0 again, i 2 t0(u), i !j 2 t(u)
which is equivalent to t(u) j=T p!j q. Now that !i  T p!j q, we get i 2 t0(u),
i t(u) j=!i . In either case, t0(u) j=i+1, i t(u) j=!i . It follows immediately
t0(v) j=T pi+1q, i t0(u) j=i+1.
In the above, we have proved that if the !-cycle liar is non-paradoxical in G,
then fk j k 2 Ng is so in G. Conversely, from a revision mapping t for fk j k 2 Ng
in G, we will nd a revision mapping t0 for the !-cycle liar in G. Dene a mapping
t0 :W !P(L+) as follows:
t0(u) = f!! j 0 =2 t(u)g [ f!k j k+1 2 t(u); k  0g :
For any u; v 2 W with uR v, it suces to prove that for all 0    !,
t0(v) j=T p!q, i t0(u) j=!. We consider three cases.
Case 1:  = 0. On one hand, t0(v) j=T p!0 q, i !0 2 t0(v). By denition
of t0, the right side of the above biconditional is equivalent to 1 2 t(v). And
so we can get t0(v) j=T p!0 q, i t(v) j=T p1q. On the other hand, t0(u) j=!0 , i
t0(u) j=:T p!!q, that is, !! =2 t0(u). By denition of t0 again, !! =2 t0(u), i 0 2
t(u) which is equivalent to t(u) j=T p0q, i.e., t(u) j=1. We know t(v) j=T p1q,
i t(u) j=1. It follows immediately t0(v) j=T p!0 q, i t0(u) j=!0 .
Case 2:  = i+1 (i  0). First, as above, we can easily see that t0(v) j=T p!i+1q,
i t(v) j=T pi+2q. Second, t0(u) j=!i+1, i t0(u) j=T p!i q, i.e., !i 2 t0(u), And
by denition of t0, !i 2 t0(u), i i+1 2 t(u), that is, t(u) j=i+2. Now that
t(v) j=T pi+2q, i t(u) j=i+2, it follows that t0(v) j=T p!i+1q, i t0(u) j=!i+1.
Case 3:  = !. On one hand, t0(v) j=T p!!q, i !! 2 t0(v), which, by de-
nition of t0, is equivalent to 0 =2 t(v), that is, t(v) 6j=T p0q. On the other hand,
since !!  8xT p!_xq, we can see t0(u) j=!!, i for all n  0, t0(u) j=T p!nq
(i.e., !n 2 t0(u)). By denition of t0 again, !n 2 t0(u), i n+1 2 t(u), that is,
t(u) j=T pn+1q. Thus, we can get t0(u) j=!!, i t(u) j=8xT pS _xq, i.e., t(u) 6j=0.
At last, note that t(v) j=T p0q, i t(u) j=0. We obtain that t0(v) j=T p!!q, i
t0(u) j=!!. ut
Theorem 7 The language L+ (i.e., the set of sentences) is paradoxical in a di-
graph, i this digraph is ungrounded.
Proof. Suppose G = hW;Ri is a connected and grounded digraph. It suces
to prove that L+ is non-paradoxical in G. By (a) of Lemma 7, we can nd an
R-minimal point in W . Let it be u0. Then by (b) of Lemma 7 and (b) of Lemma
6, for any u 2 W , we can dene d(u) as in the proof of Theorem 3. Since G is
grounded, the set fd(u) j u 2 Wg is bounded from above. Let N be the greatest
number of this set.
Let hk j k 2 Ni be the revision sequence starting from the empty set (or any
other set of sentences). We dene a mapping t from W to P(L+) as follows:
t(u) = N d(u). t is well-dened, since for any u 2W , d(u)  N . We prove t is a
revision mapping for L+ in G. To verify this, we x arbitrarily two points u and
v such that uR v. Let d(v) = k, then d(u) = k + 1. And so, t(u) = N k 1 and
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t(v) = N k. Clearly, by the denition of the revision sequence, for any A 2 L+,
we have t(v) j=T pAq, i t(u) j=A. ut
Corollary 2 The !-cycle liar, McGee's paradox and its dual all have the highest
degree of paradoxicality.
6 Discussion
What we have done up to now is to investigate the self-reference and circularity-
dependence of paradoxes in the rst-order language L+. As is mentioned in the
rst section, there is a more immediate approach to the notion of self-reference,
if we work in a sentential language. The main task of this section is to give an
outline of such an approach and make a comparison between this approach and
the present one.
Let L 0 be the sentential language, the symbols of which include countably
innite sentence names , , ,  (with and without subscripts), the connectives
:,!, _, ^, W, V and so on. The sentences of L 0 are formed as usual. For instance,
we can use
W
can combine innitely many well-formed formulas to obtain a new
formula. As usual, any truth-value assignment, that is, a function from the set of
sentence names to the set fT;Fg, can be extended uniquely to the set of sentences
under the classical two-valued schema. For convenience, for a sentence A and an
assignment , we still use (A) to denote the truth-value of A under .
Now we can dene a sentence net as a function from a set of sentence names
to a set of sentences.15 The sentence net provides a way to represent the patho-
logical sentences without the use of diagonalization. For instance, the sentence net
corresponding to the Liar paradox is the function d on fg such that d() = :.
This sentence net stipulates that  refers to :. To Yablo's paradox, the cor-
responding sentence net is the function d on fn j n 2 Ng such that for any
n 2 N, d(n) = Vk>n :k. And we can represent the 89-unwinding variant of
Yablo's paradox as the sentence net d on fn j n 2 Ng such that for any n 2 N,
d(n) =
V
k>n
W
i>k :i.
The sentence net is also an immediate way of showing to what a sentence refers.
Let d be a sentence net. For any  in the domain of d, we can take d() to be
the sentence to which  refer. This determines how the sentences denoted by the
sentence names depend on each other. Specically, we can dene a binary relation
Rd on the domain of d as follows: for any ; 
0 in the domain of d, Rd0, i 0
occurs as a syntactic constituent of d(). Now the domain of d together with the
relation Rd is dened to be `the dependence digraph' of d. What is more, we will
say that d is self-referential, if its dependence digraph contains a directed walk. d
15 The notion of sentence net was rst put forward independently by Bolander (2002) and
Cook (2002). My presentation is based upon Bolander (2003, p. 89), Cook (2004, p. 767) and
Rabern et al. (2013, p. 734). As Bolander himself pointed out (Bolander (2003), pp. 108-109),
the notion of sentence net has some precursors such as Visser's `stipulation list' in Visser
(1989). It should be mentioned that Gupta & Belnap (1993, pp. 72.) also developed some of
Visser's ideas about the stipulation lists.
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is paradoxical, if there is a truth assignment  such that for all  in the domain
of d, () = (d()).16
Most of the results we have obtained in the language L+ can be reformulated
in L 0. For instance, it can be easily seen that the sentence net corresponding to
the Liar is self-referential, but the ones to Yablo's paradox and its 89-unwinding
variant are non-self-referential. They are all paradoxical. Let us say a sentence net
is locally nite, if every point in its dependence digraph has a nite out-degree.
Then we can show that if a sentence net with a nite domain is paradoxical,
then it is self-referential; if a locally nite sentence net is paradoxical, then it is
self-referential.17 Finally, it is not hard to establish the corresponding results to
Theorem 3, 4 and 5 in the context of the language L 0.
As far as the self-reference of pathological sentences, there are also important
dierences between the sentence-net approach and the present one. For this, we
rst consider the following sentence:
sentence (5) is either true or untrue (5)
On one hand, the sentence net corresponding to sentence (5) is the function which
maps  to  _ :. This sentence net is clearly self-referential. On the other hand,
In L+, sentence (5) can be represented as a formula A satisfying the condition
A  T pAq _ :T pAq. Then what A refers to, being an instance of the excluded-
middle principle, is always true under any extension of T . Hence, A depends on
the empty set and so A is not self-referential.
The above example shows that if a sentence is self-referential by the denition
of self-reference given in L 0, it is unnecessarily so according to the criterion of
self-reference we set in L+. This dierence comes from two dierent dependence
digraphs which we use to determine the self-reference of a sentence. Given a sen-
tence net, we can obtain the binary relation of the dependence digraph by checking
whether a sentence name occurs as a syntactic constituent of the image of another
sentence name. In this sense, the dependence digraph in L 0 can be determined
`syntactically'. For sentence (5), the dependence digraph of its sentence net has a
reexive binary relation just because  is indeed a syntactic constituent of its image
 _ :. However, the dependence relation in L+, as Leitgeib himself pointed out
(Leitgeb (2005), p. 159), is a `semantic' dependence relation. The corresponding
dependence digraph cannot be determined merely by the syntactical facts. This is
exactly what we have seen in sentence (5).
Another important point we should point out is that some pathological sen-
tences may not even have the corresponding sentence net in L 0 at all. Consider
the following sentence:
sentence `sentence (6) is true' is not true (6)
16 The presentation of the three notions is based upon Bolander (2003, pp. 90-93). The notion
of 'reference graph' given by Rabern et al. (2013, p. 737) is essentially the same as Bolander's
`dependency graph'.
17 Unlike Bolander, Rabern et al. (2013) did not give a denition of self-reference, but studied
what a dependence digraph is like if it supports a paradox. For instance, they proved that if
a locally nite dependence digraph is acyclic, then it can not supports any paradox. This is
actually equivalent to the statement I just mentioned in the text. A sentence-net version of
Theorem 1 was also proved independently by Hsiung (2009b).
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In L+, it can be represented as the sentence  such that   :T 2pq. And by
Denition 7, the sentence  is indirectly self-referential. This captures the informal
self-reference of sentence (6). However, any sentence net with a singleton domain
is apparently either directly self-referential or not self-referential at all. In other
words, there is no indirectly self-referential sentence net whose domain can be a
singleton. Thus, it is impossible to use a sentence net with a singleton domain to
formulate sentence (6) in L 0. In this sense, we can say that there is no way to
formulate directly sentence (6) by use of the sentence net in L 0.
The reason why we cannot directly formulate a sentence by the sentence net is
that the sentence involves in more than one iteration times of the truth predicate.
In L 0, there is no occurrence of the truth predicate at all. This is its simplicity
but this is also its shortage. The image of any sentence name under a sentence
net is actually corresponding to a sentence of L+ in which there can be only one
iteration of the truth predicate. For instance, the sentence net for sentence (5) is
the function which maps  to _:. Here _: has a counterpart in L+, namely,
T pAq_:T pAq. This feature determines that the sentence net has severely limited
power in expressing the sentence involving in the iteration of the truth predicate.
By the way, provided that sentence (5) were a sentence stating `it is true that
either sentence (5) or its negation holds', the corresponding sentence net would
not be changed while the corresponding sentence in L+ would be a sentence A
satisfying T pA _ :Aq. From this point, we can also see that the expression power
of L 0 is not so delicate as that of L+.
Reconsidering sentence (6), we nd that we can introduce a new label for the
sentence `sentence (6) is true':
sentence (6) is true (7)
In this way, we transform sentence (6) into `sentence (7) is not true' and so reduce
the iteration time of truth predicate in (6) to one. Correspondingly, for sentence
(6) and (7), we can introduce a sentence net on f1; 2g, namely d, such that
d(1) = :2 and d(2) = 1. And of course, in the language L+ if we use
0 to denote T pq, we obtain two sentences  and 0 such that   :T p0q and
0  T pq. But we must emphasize that the sentence (6) alone is not equivalent to
the set consisting of sentence (6) and (7). A substantial dierence lies in, as is well
known, that the sentence (6) by itself is not paradoxical, but the set consisting of it
and its companion (7) is paradoxical. We can easily see this dierence if working in
the language L+. Actually, by Denition 4, the sentence  such that   :T 2pq
is not paradoxical, but the set of  and 0 is so. By contrast, as is just pointed out,
sentence (6) by itself cannot be represented by a sentence net, much less to say
that it is paradoxical in terms of L 0. Seeing this, we may say that the sentence
net d that we just mention is not a faithful representation of sentence (6) alone. It
is only corresponding to the set of sentence (6) and (7). The sentence net d does
not yet capture the informal fact that sentence (6) alone is not paradoxical.
The iteration of the truth predicate is widespread in the construction of the
pathological sentences. In some pathological sentences, the iteration of the truth
predicate can be even innite times. McGee's sentence is such an example. Infor-
mally, McGee's sentence is a sentence stating that not every result of prexing the
truth predicate to this sentence is true (McGee (1985), p. 400). In section 5, we have
represented McGee's sentence as the sentence 0 such that 0  9x:TS _xp0q.
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Note that McGee's sentence by itself is not paradoxical. What is paradoxical is
the set consisting of the sentence 0, 1 (equvalent to T p0q), 2 (equvalent to
T p1q), . . . . This is what we called `McGee's paradox'. In L 0, we can represent
McGee's paradox as the function d on fn j n 2 Ng such that d(0) = Wk>0 :k,
and for any k 2 N, d(k+1) = k. However, there is still no sentence net corre-
sponding to McGee's sentence alone.
To sum up, we have compared two denitions for the self-reference of sen-
tences: one is set up by use of Leitgeib's dependence relation in L+, and the other
is by use of the sentence net in L 0. We have found some dierences when deter-
mining the self-reference of some non-paradoxical sentences according to the two
denitions. The dierences show that the method of investigating self-reference
in the sentential language L 0 is on on hand more immediate than the one in the
rst-order language L+, on the other hand less delicate than the latter. But as
far as the paradoxical sentences are concerned, we nd that the self-reference is
necessary to the locally nite paradoxes, no matter we consider the self-reference
in L 0 or in L+. We also nd that their paradoxicality are based upon some certain
circularity conditions, and we can even compare the degrees of their paradoxicality
according to the circularity conditions. From these observations, we can conclude
that the locally nite paradoxes are a kind of simple but signicant paradoxes, and
it is their presence that reects our naive thought that paradoxes are necessarily
related to some kind of circularity.
In the end, we close our discussion by leaving two questions. Among the non-
locally-nite paradoxes, we have found examples (such as Yablo's paradox and
its 89-unwinding variant) that have circularity dependence but are free of self-
reference, and we also have examples (such as the !-cycle liar and McGee's para-
dox) that are self-referential but have no circularity dependence (see Table 1). This
raises the following question: is there any paradox which neither is self-referential
nor have circularity dependence? We think that the answer should be Yes. For
this, consider again Yablo's paradox, which, as Cook (2004) had pointed out, can
be obtained by `unwinding' the Liar paradox. And the operation of unwinding may
been taken as a procedure of eliminating self-reference of the Liar (see Sorensen
(1998), Schlenker (2007a) and Schlenker (2007b)). Besides, as has been mentioned
in Section 5, Yablo's paradox has the same degree of paradoxicality as the latter.
That is, the operation of unwinding preserves the degree of paradoxicality of the
Liar. And so, we conjecture that for any paradox, we can eliminate its self-reference
while preserving its degree of paradoxicality.18 If this conjecture were right, then
by unwinding the !-cycle liar and McGee's paradox, we would get examples to
answer positively the above question.
As has been proved in Corollary 2, the !-cycle liar and McGee's paradox
have the highest degree of paradoxicality. The second question I would like to
propose is whether there is a paradox with the lowest degree of paradoxicality.
The signicance of the existence of such a paradox is that the digraphs in which
this paradox is paradoxical are exactly the ones with the weakest condition, such
that any of paradoxes is paradoxical in these digraphs. That is, the condition is
18 It seems that the method of proving the equiparadoxicality of Yablos paradox and the Liar
in Hsiung (2013) can be somewhat generalized to the paradoxes with digraph compactness.
And so it might not hard to prove that the unwinding preserves the degree of paradoxicality
for the locally nite paradoxes. But the situation is dierent and dicult for the !-cycle liar
and McGee's paradox.
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the one that is weakest for a sentence or a set of sentences to be paradoxical in a
digraph. A candidate for the paradoxes with the lowest degree of paradoxicality, as
is pointed out by Hsiung (2017), is the paradox whose primary periods are exactly
the prime numbers.
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